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In 2018, Boeing forecasted the demand of 790,000 pilots by 2037 (Coast 
Flight Training, 2018). This predicted number is a 267% increase from the 2018 
population of active commercial pilots worldwide of 305,000, according to 
Mazareanu (2018). Kohler (2019) estimates that North America alone will require 
more than 200,000 new pilots over the next two decades. However, according to 
student trends monitored by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2019), the 
actual number is closer to 360,000 new pilots. The aviation industry will have to 
double the number of student pilots from the 2018 level and maintain that level for 
the next 18 years to meet the projected pilot demand. According to the FAA (2019), 
the number of student pilots was 167,804 in 2018, an 18,863 increase from the 2017 
levels. In order to resolve the shortage gap, the aviation community needs to recruit 
36,683 new pilots every year from 2018 to 2037.  A pilot shortage is looming, and 
it is time to revisit the regulations. 
In the past 106 years, aviation has significantly expanded from a luxury of 
leisure to a necessity of business and personnel travel. It is the cornerstone for 
international trade and has been a critical enabler for globalization. Aviation has 
influenced the current business model in every sector and changed our economic 
culture. If the aviation industry cannot find a solution to its pilot shortage, then the 
aviation industry will not be the only economic sector to suffer. The entire global 
economy will suffer. 
This paper will explore business changes airlines need to make to reduce 
the gap between pilot supply and demand. First, it will look at the history of relevant 
regulations to determine the intent behind each rule. Next, it will establish other 
crucial contributing factors to the situation, investigate each rule’s ability to meet 
the intent and the rule’s effect on the pilot shortage through complied data, and 
establish solutions by changing regulations. If the regulations are found not to be a 
factor, then the paper will evaluate other contributing factors to determine possible 
solutions to the pilot shortage and suboptimal operations of future aviation 
operations. 
 
History of Key Aviation Regulations 
Flight Hour Minimums 
In 1997, Congress instructed the FAA to “determine whether current 
minimum flight time requirements applicable to an individual seeking employment 
as a pilot with an air carrier were sufficient to ensure public safety” (FAA, 1997, p. 
3731). In response, the FAA conducted a study attempting to correlate aviation 
accidents from 1991 to 1997 with the number of hours pilot-in commands (PIC) 
and second-in-command pilots (SIC) had at the time of their accident. The FAA’s 
study found the majority of pilots-in-command (53%) involved in Part 121 
accidents had between 10,001 and 20,000 flight hours, and only 7% of first officers 
involved in Part 121 accidents had less than 2,000 hours. As a result, the agency 
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concluded that there was “no negative relationship between minimum flight hours 
and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Part 121 and 135 investigated 
accidents” and recommended no changes to the then 250 flight hour requirement 
(FAA, 1997, p. 16). 
The 250-rule stood in place until 2013 when the FAA aligned the flight hour 
requirements with the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) 2011 
standard of 1,500 hours for both PICs and SICs with PICs having at least 1,000 
hours as a SIC (FAA, 2013; Hoffman, 2014; ICAO, 2011).  The FAA contributed 
this change to Colgan Air 3407 crash in February 2009 (FAA, 2013), but the PIC 
and SIC of the accident had 3,379 and 2,244 flight hours, respectively (Jansen, 
2015). Had the 1500-hour rule been enforced before February 2009, it would not 
prevent the Colgan Air 3407 crash. 
Mandatory Retirement 
When passenger air travel began, there was no regulation forcing pilots to 
retire at a certain age. In fact, for the first few decades, each airline self-regulated 
pilot retirements. It was not until 1960 that the FAA created a mandatory retirement 
of the age 60 for air carrier pilots. When the FAA announced the rule, they gave 
four reasons behind the rule: 
• The process of aging involves “progressive deterioration of certain 
important physiological and psychological functions”; 
• the effect of the aging process cannot be determined on an individual 
basis because each person is affected by the aging process to 
different degrees at the same point in life; 
• degeneration as a result of the aging process occurs at a faster rate 
the older one becomes; and 
• the result of age degeneration is most often sudden incapacity, 
disabling an individual without prior warnings or symptoms (as 
cited in Kasperzak Jr., 1981, pp. 244-245). 
The given reasons all considered aviation safety; however, the rule formed 
from ambiguity in the aging process and limitations of the medical field in 1960. 
As the medical community made medical advancements and poor health habits 
such as smoking became less acceptable in society, a need for periodic 
reconsideration of the criteria for a mandatory retirement age of pilots occurred. In 
1980, Dr. Stanley Mohler suggested a new standard to determine “pilot fitness: 
freedom from an impairing disease, the ability to perform, and the desire to continue 
flying” (Kasperzak Jr., 1981, p. 257). This new criterion did not result in a change 
in the mandatory retirement age. 
In 2004, Dr. Russel B. Rayman redefined the criteria for the mandatory 
retirement age by asking three questions in a hearing for the Senate’s Committee 
for Aging: “after the age 60, will air transport pilots have a higher aircraft accident 
rate; will there be significant performance decrement in the cockpit; and will there 
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be an unacceptable risk of sudden in-flight incapacitation due to medical causes?” 
(pp. 1-2). Dr. Rayman was unable to draw a definitive conclusion to the first 
question because of the 34-year effect of the 60-rule (“A Fresh Look,” 2004, p. 2). 
As for the second and third questions, Dr. Rayman concluded that age had an 
insignificant impact on decrement in the cockpit, and there were safety precautions 
in place such as a SIC to prevent accidents in case of incapacitation (“A Fresh Look,” 
2004, pp. 2-3). Three years later, Congress raised the mandatory retirement age to 
65. 
 
Regulatory Effects on the Airline Industry 
Many critics, such as Silk (2017), have contributed pilot shortages to 
regulations. Some, like Silk (2017), focused on the 1,500 flight hour requirement 
while others focused on the mandatory retirement age (Kohler, 2019). Each 
provides substantial arguments to support their claims, but to truly understand these 
factors, we must conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis.  
The 1,500-Hour Rule 
If the FAA’s 1,500-rule is a core cause of the pilot shortage, then we would 
expect to see a decline in registered airline transport pilots (ATP) and commercial 
pilots since its enactment in 2013.  Instead, since 2013, we see a steady level of 
combined ATP and commercial pilots with a slight increase in levels in 2017 and 
2018. We also see a consistent rise in the number of active ATP certificates since 
2013. Commercial pilots are the only area where a significant decline occurs.  
 
Figure 1. Active Airmen Certificates (Data compiled from the FAA, 2019). 
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Qualitatively, the data does not support the conclusion that the 1,500-rule is 
contributing to the pilot shortage. Quantitatively, the data infers future issues in the 
aviation community. First, the rate of growth of ATP and commercial pilots is not 
significant enough to meet the future demand of 790,000 pilots. Secondly, since 
current regulations require pilots to obtain a commercial certificate before obtaining 
an ATP certificate (Office of the Federal Register, 2020) and there is a decline in 
commercial pilots, current trends suggest the demand for ATPs will deplete the 
number of commercial pilots until the population of commercial pilots is only pilots 
older than 65 and pilots with 1,499 hours or less. Once this event occurs, the supply 
of pilots will force airlines to hire pilots based on availability instead of demand. 
While data is not available to determine if this event has occurred or when it will 
occur, incidents such as Horizon Airlines cancellation of 300 flights in June 2017 
due to pilot shortages (Smith, 2017) suggests we have reached this critical point of 
depletion. 
Another effect worth consideration is the rule’s ability to meet the intent. 
The FAA enacted the 1,500-hour rule as a response to a fatal crash (FAA, 2013), 
and Senator Chuch Schumer stated that the regulation “undoubtedly save lives” (as 
cited in Silk, 2017, para. 25). From this response and statement, the implied intent 
of the rule is safety. The rule is a safeguard to prevent future accidents. If the rule 
meets its purpose, we would expect to see a decline in air carrier accidents after 
July 2013. 
 
Figure 2. United States Air Carrier Accident Rates 2009 – 2018 (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, 2019). 
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When the air carrier accident rate is compared to miles flown, there is a 
slight decline in the accident rate for three years following 2013; however, the data 
before 2013 suggests that the 1,500-hour is not the cause of the fall. The sharp 
decline in the five-year rolling average starting in 2004 indicates there was a change 
between 2002 and 2003 that resulted in a better safety record. The accident began 
to stabilize in 2008, and variations in the accident rate are likely natural fluctuations 
due to the dynamics of the aviation environment. 
 
 
Figure 3. U.S. Airline Accident Rate 1997-2016 According to the NTSB (as cited in 
Josephs, 2019). 
Comparing the accident rate with departures provides a different perceptive 
to air carriers’ safety records. This dataset better depicts the most dangerous modes 
of flight: take-off and landing. The five-year rolling average supports the same 
conclusion as the previous dataset. A change caused a significant decline in airline 
accidents beginning in 2004 and stabilizing in 2008. The slight and steady increase 
in accident rates after 2008 signals that 1,500-hour rule enacted in 2013 does not 
affect airline accidents.  
Mandatory Retirement 
There are several different estimates on the number of airline pilots retiring 
in the next decade; however, according to the FAA (2019), 46,188 qualified airline 
pilots with current medical physicals will lose their ability to fly for an airline in 
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commercial airmen certificate growth for 2018 and assuming that all pilots 
presently holding commercial pilots qualify for an ATP certificate for the next 20 
years, the commercial pilot population will deplete by 2039 if airlines replace all 
their retiring pilots with commercial pilots. Since the current population of 
commercial pilots consists of retired airline pilots and pilots that do not have 1,500 
yet, the actual date of depletion will occur earlier. 
 
Other Contributing Factors to the Pilot Shortage 
Government regulations have imposed limitations affecting both the entry 
and exit of the pilot population, but there are other factors limiting entry into the 
industry. In addition to regulations, Bob Seidel contributes demographic shifts and 
socioeconomic factors to the pilot shortage (as cited in Garcia, 2018, para. 10). Both 
factors are worth consideration since demographic shifts in military veterans 
continuing careers as airline pilots are changing the financial burden most student 
pilots incur during qualifications.  
The Demographic Shift 
According to Kevin Kuhlmann, most pilots hired in the 1980s were from 
the military, and only a quarter of new pilots were non-veterans, but today that 
statistic is reverse (as cited in Kohler, 2019, para. 12). The military was a primary 
and complementary source of pilots in the civilian sector because the military had 
an abundance of pilots. In 1941, the Army Air Force was producing 30,000 pilots a 
year due to World War II (Craven & Cate, 1955, p. 433). Other peaks in pilot 
training occurred in 1953 as the Air Force produced approximately 7,200 pilots a 
year for the Korean War and in 1970 with 3,500 annual trainees for the Vietnam 
War (Ashcroft, 2005; Axe, 2018). After the conclusion of each war, the military 
reduced the number of pilot positions, and the result was a greater supply of pilots 
for air carriers than the demand. Regulations would force most of these surplus 
pilots to retire from the airlines in the 1980s and the last of them to retire in 2019.  
Presently, the military is no longer a primary source of pilots for the airlines, 
nor is it complementary. As of March of 2020, the Air Force had a deficit of 2,100 
pilots (Axe, 2020); thus, making the Air Force a competitor for pilots. All branches 
of the military had similar figures. To gain an advantage in the competition for 
pilots, the Air Force is introducing several strategies. The Air Force started offering 
$420,000 retention bonuses in 2018 if a pilot completes 12 years in the branch 
(Losey, 2018). The addition of this bonus means the annual income for an Air Force 
pilot is between $74,444 and $165,000 without the inclusion of housing and 
substance allowances, hazardous flight pay, and additional benefits such as free 
medical and dental care. The Air Force also offers free flight training and a skill set 
for a promising career in the airlines after the pilot exits the service. While these 
strategies are encouraging, the major airlines can still compete with higher pay and 
the lack of military-related demands; however, there is one strategy the military has 
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that can nullify any competition from the airlines. The military, when authorized by 
the Commander-in-Chief, can involuntarily recall pilots back into service, 
immediately reducing the number of pilots working for the airlines.  
The Socioeconomic Factor 
The demographic shift in pilot backgrounds has resulted in another relevant 
factor: socioeconomics. When the military was the primary source of pilots for the 
airlines, the cost of pilot qualification was not a concern for the airlines. The 
majority of pilots received their qualifications at the expense of the taxpayer. Today, 
this is no longer true; therefore, pilot qualification costs are now a critical factor in 
the airlines’ ability to recruit new pilots. According to Pletz (2020), it can cost an 
aspiring pilot $80,000 to become a certified pilot instructor (CFI). Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University (2020) estimates that attending flight students will pay 
between $91,924 and $111,924 for a four-year aviation degree and a restricted air 
transport pilot certificate. These costs may discourage aspiring pilots considering 
the average annual salary for a CFI is $49,649 (Glassdoor, 2020), and an entry-level 
pilot position for a regional airline is approximately $36,000 (Epic Flight Academy, 
2019).   
High pilot qualification costs and low starting salaries place most starting 
pilots in a financial burden. If a new pilot had accepted $110,000 in student loans 
with an interest rate of 4.79% for 10 years, then they would be required to pay back 
$13,865 in the first year. Assuming they were also able to obtain a CFI position 
making $49,649, the loan payments would account for 27.9% of their income. This 
percentage would increase to 38.5% if the pilot started working at a regional airline 
at $36,000. After making payments on the student loan, the assumed regional pilot 
would have a useable income of $22,134.48 for their first year, which is below the 
United States poverty line for a family of four (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2020). Situations like the ones above eliminate potential pilots 
who cannot afford the qualification costs or do not wish to have a reduced standard 
of living for the first few years from entering the industry.  
 
Discussion 
The United States government introduced the 1,500-hour rule under 
favorable intentions. The purpose of the government is to protect the society which 
it serves. The introduction of the rule in response to a fatal airline crash serves that 
rationale. Despite the justification for the enactment of the law, insignificant 
changes in the accident rate after 2013 proves the rule did not meet its intent. If the 
rule does not meet the designed intention, then we must consider the benefits and 
liabilities for keeping the rule in its current state. 
Several people have claimed the 1,500-hour rule is a cause of the current 
pilot shortage. The data does not support this claim. The level of commercial and 
air carrier pilots combined as remained relatively the same since 2009. The only 
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significant change during this period is an increase in air carrier pilots with a 
corresponding decrease in commercial pilots. If the demand for pilots remained at 
the 2018 levels, then the argument for revoking the rule would be nugatory. If 
anything, the rule provides comfort to passengers in the knowledge that their pilots 
have experience.  
Forecasts tell us that the demand for pilots will not remain at the 2018 
levels; therefore, keeping the rule in its current state does create liabilities. While 
the rule does not directly contribute to the pilot shortage, it does limit the rate in 
which pilots can start working for airlines. Considering the 267% required increase 
in pilots by 2037, the rule may prove detrimental to the airlines’ ability to fill flight 
decks. The airlines would have to deplete the pool of commercial pilots and then 
wait until future airline pilots obtain 1,500 hours or complete their military 
obligations. Once the pool of commercial pilots depletes, then a safety issue can 
arise. An airline’s ability to hire quality pilots over minimally qualified pilots is 
dependent on the number of available applicants. If the number of quality applicants 
is below the needed amount of pilots, the airlines may feel pressured in hiring pilots 
having a subpar performance compared to the airline’s usual standards, resulting in 
a compromise in safety.  Besides, the rule keeps most starting pilots in positions 
with low salaries for more prolonged periods; thus, discouraging new pilots from 
entering the industry.  
The government also designed the regulation regarding the mandatory 
retirement age as a safety consideration. The rationale behind the rule derives from 
the assumption that pilot skills diminish, and the risk of an incapacitating health 
event increases with age. In the 1950s and 1960s, limitations in medicine made 
predicting incapacitating health events difficult. Since pilots required excellent 
physical and mental health, it was logical for the government to use a general rule 
of diminishing health rather than individual cases as a measure for retirement.  
Today, medical and aviation advancements have changed the dynamics 
concerning pilot retirements. While not perfect, the medical community can now 
predict incapacitating health events based on risk factors, key health indicators, and 
human behaviors. In addition, advancements in technology have enabled more 
accurate detection of diminishing skills such as sight, reaction time, and cognitive 
functions. Modern aircraft systems and flight procedures now include 
precautionary mechanisms that account for an incapacitated pilot. For example, an 
Airbus a350 is capable of flying based on data entered before the flight and autoland. 
Also, the flight controls are easily transferable to the alert pilot in the case of an 
incapacitated pilot. With these advancements and frequent rigorous medical exams, 
it may be time to considering moving away from a general preventative measure to 
an individual level. 
Still, we must weigh the benefits and liabilities in consideration of the rule’s 
validity. Changing the retirement age would not provide any significant changes to 
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the current situation. If the government were to change the age to 67 years old, it 
would only delay the majority of force retirements by two years in the most 
favorable circumstances. There is no guarantee that pilots would continue to work 
past the age of 65 if given the option. Eliminating the retirement age only changes 
how the government evaluates the competency of pilots. However, the law is still 
unnecessarily restrictive. Dr. Mohler said that “age alone, as in the case with race 
or sex, gives no information about an individual’s competency or health” (as cited 
in Kasperzak Jr., 1981, p. 257). Since age alone is not a factor, and we now have 
measures to protect us from sudden pilot incapacity, the rule no longer serves its 
purpose and should be eliminated. 
Changing either regulation does not provide a significant solution to the 
pilot shortage. All it will do is remove unnecessary restrictions. Pilot levels did not 
differ significantly in periods with or without the rules in effect; therefore, we must 
look at other contributing factors to find a method of recruiting new pilots in the 
required numbers. Airlines do not have much influence on military manning levels, 
but they can influence the pilot qualification costs.  
The major airlines have an opportunity to eliminate the financial burden for 
student pilots wishing to become air carrier pilots while making a substantial profit 
for the airlines. The key to this opportunity is an income share agreement (ISA). In 
this particular case, an ISA would be a contract between the airline and the student 
in which the airline pays qualification costs in exchange for a percentage of future 
wages for a specified period. For example, United Airlines could agree to pay 
$110,000 for a student’s degree and flight training in exchange for 6.7% of the 
student’s future wages for 10 years in which the student is making more than 50,000 
dollars, not to exceed 200% of the cost of training. If executed properly, this method 
will eliminate the pilot shortage by attracting significantly more aspiring pilots 
while producing billions of dollars for the airlines.  
For the student, ISAs have several advantages over student loans with one 
notable disadvantage. First, an ISA is not a traditional loan; therefore, it does not 
go on a student’s credit report. As a result, it does not increase the student’s debt-
to-income ratio, allowing the student freedom to make major purchases such as a 
house. Secondly, the student does not have to worry about the ISA in times of 
economic hardship. If the student is working below the wage requirement stated in 
the ISA or became unemployed, then the ISA repayments would be placed on hold. 
This element of the ISA would significantly reduce the probability of the student 
living at or below the poverty line. Finally, it allows the student to become 
financially stable earlier in their life by providing time to establish an emergency 
fund and other necessary savings. However, there remains the probability that the 
student would pay more money back to the airlines then if they had elected to use 
a traditional student loan. Depending on the interest rate, a student may only pay 
20,000 dollars in interest with a 110,000-dollar student loan. With an ISA, the 
9
Caraway: A Looming Pilot Shortage: It is Time to Revisit Regulations
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2020
  
student could pay between 4,000 and 110,000 dollars in addition to the original 
110,000 dollars. However, for the pilot to pay back an additional $110,000 with the 
proposed contracted stated above, the pilot would be making over $350,000 in their 
tenth year.  
ISAs also provide several advantages for the airlines. First, the ISA does not 
take into consideration the employer of the student. If United Airlines paid for the 
training and the pilot is hired by Delta Airlines, United Airlines still receives a 
percentage of the pilot’s wages. Secondly, it allows the airlines to maintain pilot 
standards by giving the airlines input into school selection. Airlines can limit ISA 
offering to students that attend approved schools. Third, if the airline reduces the 
hourly wage by the percentage stated in the ISA, the airline can reduce the payroll 
tax owed to the government. Finally, if executed properly, the airlines have the 
potential to save billions of dollars in wages. If Wi equals the wages above the ISA 
salary requirement a pilot makes in a given year, I equals the interest rate, and C 
equals qualification costs, then the savings an airline could make is represented by 
the formulas: 
10
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where P equals a pilot, and x equals the total number of pilots given ISAs. Given 
the ISA conditions stated above, the pay scale of United Airline pilots according to 
Airline Pilot Central (2020a, 202b), and the assumptions that a pilot will not make 
more than $50,000 until they begin employment with a major airline, not change 
airframes throughout their careers, works 80 hours a month and makes captain at 
their five-year mark, an airline would expect to save $4,913.04, 28,931.20, 
29,124.16, and 57,176 for an a319, 757, a320, and 787 pilots respectively. If the 
airlines give the 360,000 pilots needed to eliminate the pilot gap, then the total 
savings can range from 1.7 to 20.5 billion dollars. If the airlines were able to capture 
the maximum repayment of 200% for all 360,000 pilots, then this number would 
increase to $39.6 billion. However, the airlines will not realize these savings until 
12 to 16 years after the investment if the assumption is the pilot works for a regional 
airline for two years immediately following completion of their flight training. In 
addition, the airline will assume the risk of ensuring the pilot becomes employed 
with wages above the ISA requirement. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite several claims, regulations are not the core cause of the current pilot 
shortage; however, they are unnecessary. They also restrict the rate of growth in the 
population of commercial and air carrier pilots. Modifying or eliminating these 
regulations can prove a catalyst to resolve the pilot shortage quickly. Resolving the 
pilot shortage issue requires airlines to focus on qualification costs. Improving the 
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quality of life and reducing the financial burden of potential pilots should attract 
the number of pilots needed to meet future demands. Airlines can accomplish this 
using ISAs. ISAs will not only accomplish the goal of resolving the pilot shortage; 
it will reduce the student loan crisis and provide an additional benefit of increased 
profits for the airlines. 
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